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Abstract
This article re-examines the US–Central American sanctu-
ary movement of the 1980s . Our re-examination is motiv-
ated by two factors . First, with the passage of time it is pos-
sible to discern the movement’s origins in ways that could 
not be fully articulated while it was ongoing . We are able 
to show how certain relationships between the movement’s 
North and Central American activists were celebrated, 
while others were obscured due to fear for Salvadoran 
immigrant activists’ safety and concern about inadver-
tently undermining the movement’s legitimacy . Specifically, 
we draw attention to the movement’s transnational nature, 
noting that what made it so powerful was its origin as part 
of a broader effort by Salvadoran revolutionaries to mobil-
ize North American society to oppose US support for the 
Salvadoran government . Ironically, to achieve this objective 
Salvadoran immigrant activists had to stay quiet, become 
invisible, and abstain from taking certain leadership roles, 
while embracing identities that may have implied weak-
ness or passivity, such as “refugee” or “victim .” Second, 
the US–Central American sanctuary movement provides 
powerful insight into future understandings of sanctuary 
as a concept and practice . The movement’s legacies extend 
beyond participants’ stated goals, while the movement’s 
transnational political and organizational focus differenti-
ates it from current sanctuary practices . Thus, re-examin-
ing its origins and legacies suggests that apparent similar-
ities in the form of sanctuary incidents may hide underlying 
differences and that current sanctuary practices may also 
eventually have unanticipated consequences .
Résumé
Cet article examine à nouveau le « sanctuary movement » 
aux États-Unis et en Amérique centrale durant les années 
1980 . Deux facteurs expliquent ce réexamen . 1°, avec le 
passage du temps, il est possible de discerner les origines du 
mouvement qui ne pouvaient pas être entièrement articu-
lées alors qu’il était en cours . Nous sommes en mesure de 
montrer comment certaines relations entre activistes nord-
américains et leurs contreparties centre-américaines ont 
été fêtées, tandis que d’autres ont été occultées par crainte 
pour la sécurité des militants salvadoriens pro immigration 
et par peur d’accidentellement miner la légitimité du mou-
vement . Plus précisément, nous attirons l’attention sur la 
nature transnationale du mouvement, soulignant que ce 
qui l’a rendu si puissant sont ses origines dans le cadre d’un 
effort plus large par les révolutionnaires salvadoriens en 
vue de mobiliser la société nord-américaine en opposition 
à l’appui des États-Unis pour le pouvoir salvadorien . Ironie 
du sort, pour atteindre cet objectif les militants salvado-
riens ont dû rester muets, devenir invisibles et s’abstenir de 
prendre certains rôles de leadership, tout en affichant des 
identités, comme « réfugié » ou « victime », qui pouvaient 
implicitement signifier la faiblesse ou la passivité . 2°, le 
« sanctuary movement » des États-Unis et de l’Amérique 
centrale donne un puissant aperçu de notre compréhension 
future de la notion de sanctuaire en tant que concept et 
pratique . Le legs du mouvement va au-delà des objectifs 
déclarés des participants, alors que son accent transnatio-
nal, politique et organisationnel le différencie des pratiques 
actuelles . Ainsi, un réexamen des origines du mouvement 
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et de son héritage suggère que des similitudes apparentes 
sous la forme de cas de sanctuaire peuvent masquer des 
différences sous-jacentes et que les pratiques actuelles du 
sanctuaire peuvent aussi avoir des conséquences éventuel-
les imprévues .
Given the proliferation of sanctuary activities inter-nationally and the emergence of the new sanctuary movement in the United States,1 it is worthwhile to 
re-examine what may be the best-known instance of sanctu-
ary  practices: the US–Central American sanctuary move-
ment of the 1980s. Our re-examination of this movement is 
motivated by two factors. The first is our sense that, with the 
passage of time, it is possible to discern the movement’s ori-
gins and influences in a way that could not be fully articu-
lated (even by its protagonists) while it was ongoing, and also 
that, with hindsight, the legacies of the sanctuary movement 
may now be more apparent. In particular, we seek to draw 
attention to the transnational nature of the US–Central 
American sanctuary movement, in terms of both the move-
ment’s organizational structure and its impact. It is perhaps 
obvious that a movement that was dedicated to securing pol-
itical asylum for Central American asylum seekers and that 
(in at least some quarters) opposed US military intervention 
in Central American was transnational. What may be less 
obvious, however, is the degree to which sanctuary activ-
ities emerged as part of Central Americans’ broader effort 
to mobilize sectors of the North American population in 
support of organized civil society actors working for social 
justice in El Salvador. Furthermore, although it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to discuss those particular connec-
tions, Mexican and Canadian organizers and colleagues 
were part of the underground and above ground “railroad” 
along which Central Americans travelled, and Mexican 
movement participants were among those prosecuted in 
the 1985–1986 Tucson sanctuary trial.2 This transnational 
political and organizational focus presents a clear difference 
between the 1980s US–Central American sanctuary move-
ment, which was one part of a broader Central America 
peace and solidarity movement, and current sanctuary prac-
tices in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere, in which 
local communities seek primarily immigration remedies for 
individuals who are at immediate risk of deportation.3
Second, we believe that revisiting the US–Central 
American sanctuary movement offers valuable lessons 
that can give us powerful insight into future understand-
ings of sanctuary as a concept and practice. The legacies of 
the US–Central American sanctuary movement are broad, 
extending beyond movement participants’ stated goals of 
securing refuge, condemning human rights abuses, and 
preventing US military intervention abroad. Unintended 
consequences of sanctuary practices include complex legal 
changes in the United States, increased remittance flows 
to Central America, and the development of new networks 
of civil society organizations in both countries. Though 
not the sole cause of the changes that occurred, sanctuary 
activities were a necessary precondition for these develop-
ments. Thus, re-examining the movement’s origins and 
legacies suggests that apparent resemblances in the form of 
sanctuary incidents may hide underlying differences. It also 
allows us to note that shifts in ‘the bases for legitimacy lead 
some transnational connections and movement objectives 
to be celebrated while others are obscured. It also suggests 
that current sanctuary practices, like those of the 1980s 
US–Central American sanctuary movement, may eventu-
ally have unanticipated consequences as well.
In re-examining the US–Central American sanctuary 
movement, we bring together two different sorts of expertise. 
Hector Perla is a political scientist, specializing in US-Latin 
American relations, social and revolutionary movements, 
and Central American political engagement in the US. Perla’s 
work is focused on highlighting the formal and contentious 
strategies that Central American activists, in their home 
countries and in the diaspora, use to challenge US foreign 
policy toward the region. The bulk of his interviews have 
been with Salvadoran solidarity activists and revolutionary 
militants in, or formerly based in, San Francisco and Los 
Angeles.4 Susan Bibler Coutin, an anthropologist, did field-
work within the San Francisco East Bay region and Tucson, 
Arizona, segments of the US–Central American sanctuary 
movement during the 1980s. As part of this fieldwork, she 
participated in sanctuary activities, interviewed one hun-
dred movement participants, and collected documents and 
literature produced by and about the movement.5 During 
the 1990s and the 2000s, she followed Central Americans’ 
efforts to secure permanent legal status for their undocu-
mented or only temporarily documented compatriots in 
the United States.6 It is important to note that because our 
fieldwork focused on sanctuary communities in California 
and Arizona, there may be differences between the account 
derived from this research and the origins and advocacy 
work in other key movement sites, such as Chicago.
Bringing our expertise together allows us to focus on 
the agency of Central American collective actors (Frente 
Farabundo Marti de la Liberación Nacional, or FMLN, 
Farabundo Martin National Liberation Front, a coalition of 
five guerrilla organizations and its supporters) in the con-
text of a strategic interaction (the Salvadoran Civil War, 
in which the US government was a central protagonist), 
without sacrificing a deep understanding of the on-the-
ground dynamics of the sanctuary movement as it unfolded. 
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Moreover we contextualize our analysis of this movement 
in a transnational framework that does not force a dichot-
omous definition of sanctuary as either a purely foreign or 
completely domestic movement. This contextualization, 
in turn, allows us to describe the nuanced relationships 
existing between North and Central American activists in 
a way that was impossible during and immediately after the 
conflict due either to fear for Salvadoran immigrant activ-
ists’ safety or to concern about inadvertently undermining 
the movement’s legitimacy. Specifically, we are now able to 
show how certain relationships within the sanctuary move-
ment were celebrated, while others were hidden. In other 
words, we argue that part of what made the US–Central 
American sanctuary movement so powerful was that it 
emerged as part of a broader effort by Central American 
revolutionaries to mobilize opposition to US support for the 
Salvadoran government. But also we point out that, to do 
so, Salvadoran immigrants had to be willing to strategically 
stay quiet, become invisible, or abstain from taking on cer-
tain leadership roles in the movement, while, for the sake of 
achieving their and the movement’s objectives, embracing 
identities that, to some, implied weakness or passivity, such 
as “refugees” or “victims.” In this way Salvadoran immi-
grant activists used their strategic invisibility as a form of 
power, along the lines of what political scientists Keck and 
Sikkink have called leverage and accountability politics.7 
Analyzing the movement’s framing of Central Americans 
as refugees makes it possible to identify broader political 
and other legacies of sanctuary activities, legacies that may 
not have been intended or anticipated by movement organ-
izers. In particular, we draw attention to the ways that the 
success of the “refugee” framing created legal benefits that, 
in the postwar context, allowed the many years that Central 
Americans had lived in the US to be recognized as grounds 
for granting legal permanent residency, a recognition that 
had implications for Central American economies and non-
governmental organizations.
First, we describe the origins of the sanctuary move-
ment in the United States and provide background infor-
mation on the causes of political upheaval and migration 
by Salvadorans to the United States. Second, we document 
the transnational nature of the movement, highlighting the 
role of Central American refugees and immigrants whose 
participation in the movement has not been fully described 
or theorized. Third, we explore the unintended positive and 
negative consequences that the sanctuary movement engen-
dered, including the legalization and growth of the Central 
American community in the United States, as well as the 
astronomical rise of remittances to El Salvador. Finally, we 
discuss how the movement has come full circle. That is, we 
draw attention to the fact that unjust economic and  political 
conditions in El Salvador, conditions to which US foreign 
policy contributed and that originally gave rise to the sanc-
tuary movement, are still present in the country today. 
Consequently, we document ways that organizations and 
activists that are in El Salvador and that have roots in or 
links to sanctuary are now fighting for Salvadoran citizens’ 
right not to become migrants in the face of economic dis-
parities, insecurity, and the dangerous nature of the trek to 
the United States.
Historical Context of the US–Central American 
Sanctuary Movement
From 1932 until the late 1970s El Salvador was ruled by a 
series of military dictators who came into office through 
either uncompetitive elections or coups. Starting in the late 
1960s this system of governance began to be challenged by a 
growing collection of social movements. By 1972 this chal-
lenge had evolved to include a coalition of political parties 
of the centre and left (National Opposition Union, or UNO) 
with the support of many important civil society actors, 
which fielded a strong presidential candidate, José Napoleón 
Duarte. While it is widely believed that the UNO coalition 
won these elections, its candidates were not allowed to take 
office. In fact its presidential candidate was arrested and 
tortured, and had to go into exile. This electoral challenge 
was repeated in 1977 with similar results, anointing another 
high-ranking military officer, Carlos Romero, winner of the 
presidential race.
As a result of government intransigence, these institu-
tional political challenges were accompanied by an upswing 
in social movement mobilization among unions and stu-
dent, peasant, and religious organizations. The Salvadoran 
government responded to this contentious political chal-
lenge in much the same way that it met the formal political 
challenges to its authority—with violence; but it went after 
the social movement with even greater and ever-increasing 
levels of brutality. This brutality fed support for the incipient 
but rapidly growing armed revolutionary organizations that 
began forming in the early 1970s and would come together 
in 1980 to form the FMLN.8 At the same time, violence also 
caused many students, union members, and other activists 
to migrate to the United States in increasing numbers.
The rise of the US–Central American sanctuary move-
ment was directly related to the dramatic increase in the 
numbers of undocumented Salvadorans fleeing political 
repression, social upheaval, and economic distress caused 
by the Salvadoran Civil War. Today, because of this expo-
nential population growth, Salvadorans are the fourth-lar-
gest Latino-origin group in the United States behind only 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, numbering over 
two million and making up between 3 and 5 per cent of the 
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total Latino population of the US.9 While Salvadorans have 
resided in parts of the United States since at least the end of 
World War II, they did not come in large numbers until the 
late 1970s and especially early 1980s.10 As violence escalated, 
particularly from government security forces and allied clan-
destine death squads, Salvadorans began moving from the 
countryside to the cities and eventually abroad, especially 
to the United States. By 1984, according to Byrne, “within 
El Salvador there were 468,000 displaced people (9.75 per-
cent of the population), 244,000 in Mexico and elsewhere 
in Central America, and 50,000 more in the United States, 
for a total of more than 1.2 million displaced and refugees 
(25 percent of the population).”11 While the US census esti-
mated that in 1970 there were only 15,717 Salvadorans in 
the country, by 1980 that figure had grown to 94,447 and by 
1990 had skyrocketed to 465,433.12 Other estimates during 
the mid and late1980s put the number significantly higher. 
For instance, a 1985 study by the Urban Institute estimated 
that there were between 554,000 and 903,000 Salvadorans 
living in the US at the time.13 Likewise Montes and Garcia 
put the number of Salvadorans residing in the US at some-
where between 988,551 and 1,042,340.14 Whatever the true 
number, the reality is that the massive influx of Salvadoran 
refugees arriving daily throughout the decade, some with 
papers but most without, quickly overburdened the capacity 
of established kinship and friendship social networks to 
provide adequate assistance to the new arrivals.15
Meanwhile it was becoming clear that US foreign policy 
toward the country would play a crucial role in determin-
ing the outcome of El Salvador’s future governance. Despite 
its rhetorical commitment to human rights, throughout 
most of its tenure in office the Carter administration main-
tained support for the Salvadoran regime. When the Reagan 
administration came into office this support increased expo-
nentially. Throughout the 1980s, US military and economic 
support for the Salvadoran government would total in 
excess of $6 billion. This support not only included extensive 
counter-insurgency training and provision of vast quantities 
of sophisticated armaments but, as was later acknowledged, 
also included active combat engagement against the FMLN 
by US military personnel.16
Transnational Nature of the Central American 
Sanctuary Movement
It was in this context of increased repression, immigration, 
and US involvement that the US–Central American sanctu-
ary movement was born. The earliest organizational precur-
sors to what would become the Central American solidarity 
movement, of which the US–Central American sanctuary 
movement was a key component, were several Salvadoran 
immigrant-based organizations.17 These organizations were 
made up primarily of already established Salvadoran immi-
grant and US-born Salvadoran activists, who initially came 
together to denounce the lack of democratic freedoms in their 
home country, the Salvadoran military’s human rights viola-
tions, and US aid to the Salvadoran government under these 
conditions. The first of these organizations was the Comité 
de Salvadoreños Progresistas (Committee of Progressive 
Salvadorans), which was founded in San Francisco in 1975 
in response to the massacre of students from the University 
of El Salvador. The organization grew quickly and soon 
had the capacity to publish a weekly newspaper and even 
occupy the Salvadoran consulate. Shortly thereafter other 
Salvadoran immigrant-based organizations sprouted in 
others cities around the US with large Salvadoran commun-
ities. Among the most prominent of these organizations 
were Casa El Salvador (several cities), the Comité Farabundo 
Martí (also known as Casa El Salvador–Farabundo Martí), 
and the Movimiento Amplio en Solidaridad con El Pueblo 
Salvadoreño (MASPS). These immigrant-based groups often 
had ties to social movement organizations in El Salvador, 
which in turn were connected to different FMLN factions. 
These linkages usually originated in kinship or friendship 
ties, although some originated from immigrants’ own pre-
vious activism in El Salvador. While the original initiatives 
of these organizations primarily sought to reach out to the 
Salvadoran and Latin American populations in the US, 
almost immediately progressive North Americans began 
gravitating toward their efforts.18 In many instances, the 
North Americans brought with them prior experiences, such 
as involvement in anti-war activism during the Vietnam 
War, the freedom rides of the civil rights movement, and 
church-based refugee resettlement work. Therefore, sanctu-
ary practices built on both North and Central Americans’ 
rich experiences of social justice work.
During a 2000 interview, Don White, a Los Angeles–based 
organizer with the Committee in Solidarity with the People 
of El Salvador (CISPES), recalled how North Americans 
were brought into Central American solidarity work:
Very early in the 80s, the different tendencies from El Salvador 
then began to develop their projects. And this is nothing that 
people were critical about. It was very natural for the political enti-
ties in El Salvador to come here and organize among their own 
compañeros, compañeras, their comrades they felt comfortable 
with. So certain agencies grew up [that were] identified with one 
of the five armies of the FMLN. We collaborated over ending U.S. 
military intervention, to end all military aid to El Salvador. All 
groups agreed on that point of unity. So it was easy to collabor-
ate with all. The second [point] was direct political support to the 
FMLN and political and economic material support to the popular 
movement. And sending delegations and mobilizing U.S. citizens 
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to oppose intervention, and those who were able to make the next 
step to declare their solidarity with the struggle in El Salvador. 
But many CISPES activists, many North Americans, were anti-
interventionists, but never took the step toward solidarity. If we 
once took them to El Salvador and got them in El Salvador to meet 
the Salvadoreans, to see the struggle, especially during the war, 
when it was a very dramatic experience, often they would become 
solidarity activists, raise money for the popular movement.
In addition, these immigrant-based organizations’ missions 
were originally focused on changing US foreign policy. 
However, it quickly became apparent to immigrant activists 
that they needed to do something to respond not only to the 
plight of their compatriots in their home country, but, with 
growing urgency, to the plight of an ever-increasing num-
ber of Salvadorans who were seeking refuge in the United 
States. At the same time, they also realized that these new 
arrivals’ testimonies would serve as extremely compelling 
educational tools for North American audiences unfamiliar 
with US complicity in what was happening in El Salvador. 
As the then-director of the San Francisco Comité Farabundo 
Martí, Jose Artiga, explains,
This is where I feel that the Salvadorans’ role is very important, 
sometimes making the invitation, sometimes giving their blessing 
[through their testimonies]. The invitation was really important 
because people after a presentation or after becoming aware of the 
situation would have a really bad feeling and you’d say it’s your 
tax dollars that are financing these human rights violations and 
the question they would ask is what can I do? And here is where 
with lots of creativity we had a menu of things that people could 
do … join CISPES, sanctuary, support refugees.
Consequently, Salvadoran activists moved quickly to 
establish organizations to meet the immediate survival 
needs of their community, and other groups to advocate 
for their legal needs. Toward this end both Salvadoreños 
Progresistas and Casa El Salvador Farabundo Martí cre-
ated new organizations, which began providing housing 
and social as well as legal services for refugees in the late 
1970s at Most Holy Redeemer’s Catholic Church in San 
Francisco’s Castro District where their offices were located. 
The first organization, started by Salvadoreños Progresistas, 
was called Amigos de El Salvador (Friends of El Salvador).19 
Casa Farabundo Martí soon followed suit, creating two 
organizations: the Centro de Refugiados Centroamericanos 
(CRECEN) and the Central American Resource Center 
(CARECEN).20 This redundancy is illustrative of the infight-
ing that became prevalent among Salvadoran immigrant-
based organizations throughout the 1980s and, indicat-
ing the degree to which solidarity work was transnational, 
mirrored the divisions that existed among the social move-
ments and FMLN in El Salvador. These divisions sometimes 
led to strife between organizations with different contacts 
in the Salvadoran social and revolutionary movement, as 
well as to the creation of parallel solidarity organizations. 
To again quote Don White, “certain agencies grew up [that 
were] identified with one of the five armies of the FMLN …. 
In the early days, they often did not visit each other’s agen-
cies, because they saw them as I suppose both competitive, 
but also to some degree a different line of the Salvadorean 
struggle, which they might not have agreed with.” As a 
result of these fratricidal conflicts, organizations such as 
Salvadoreños Progresistas and Amigos de El Salvador, 
despite their early accomplishments, were effectively red-
baited and evicted from their offices.21 While neither of these 
organizations would play a direct role in the creation of the 
US–Central American sanctuary movement, it is important 
to note that Salvadoreños Progresistas pioneered the strategy 
of immigrants approaching members of religious organiza-
tions to collaborate with them in an effort to mobilize the 
religious community, which other Salvadoran immigrant 
organizations would use to launch the movement. In 1981, 
following this strategy, members of the Santana Chirino 
Amaya Refugee Committee and the Southern California 
Ecumenical Council came together in Los Angeles to cre-
ate El Rescate. The organization’s stated mission was “to 
respond with free legal and social services to the mass influx 
of refugees fleeing the war in El Salvador.”22
CARECEN, CRECEN, and El Rescate would each go on 
to play a key role in the development of the national sanc-
tuary movement. Through these organizations, Central 
American activists mobilized pastors and congregants by 
educating them about events in Central America, US for-
eign policy, and the imminent danger that persecution vic-
tims would be deported back to their place of persecution. 
In Los Angeles, these groups worked closely with SCITCA, 
the Southern California Interfaith Task Force on Central 
America, to offer sanctuary to Central American refu-
gees.23 In the San Francisco East Bay, where Susan Coutin 
did fieldwork in the late 1980s, a member of the Comité de 
Refugiados Centroamericanos (CRECE) sent a representa-
tive to monthly steering committee meetings of the East 
Bay Sanctuary Covenant (EBSC). CRECE also arranged for 
Central Americans to speak publicly about their experiences 
to US audiences.24 Central Americans were also an active 
force in sanctuary communities in Tucson, Washington, 
D.C., Houston, New York, Milwaukee, and elsewhere. As 
Jose Artiga, the former director of the San Francisco Comité 
Farabundo Martí, recounts,
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Our goal was to create more organizations, to create more chapters 
(contacts) … not among the Salvadorans, if they were there we’d 
organize them, but more than anything the larger focus was the 
North Americans … so that they would be part of something [soli-
darity or peace organizations]. Then parallel to that was formed 
the sanctuary churches. That was a different group of people 
… who took that and gave it its own life … This menu of activ-
ities also included a range of political pressure, which included 
participating in a vigil to participating in civil disobedience … I 
remember that in Philadelphia, we asked the sanctuary churches 
to go to the house of Senator Specter after Sunday services … they 
would hold vigils directly in front of his house and even if they 
were not large, but with 10 people in front of his home they made 
him uncomfortable.
As can be gleaned from the above quotes, one of the 
things that solidarity activists recognized early on was the 
strategic framing of the “refugee identity.” This framing was 
a particular way of talking about and presenting Salvadoran 
immigrants to North American audiences, especially to 
those with no previous knowledge of the conflict and with-
out any political, ideological, or epistemic connection to 
the plight of the Salvadoran people. Salvadoran immigrant 
activists realized that it was not enough to educate North 
Americans about what was happening in El Salvador and 
US government complicity in the human rights violations. 
It was also essential to create empathy, to spark a sense of 
urgency and obligation or responsibility that would motiv-
ate North Americans to take a stand against their own 
government on behalf of an “other” with whom they were 
largely unfamiliar.25 Central Americans’ organizing prac-
tices also had to be adapted to dominant US norms, values, 
and perceptions of how North Americans saw themselves 
and saw Third World “others.” (In essence, these prac-
tices had to appeal to liberal ideals.) The narrative con-
struct of the “refugee” met these needs by simultaneously 
drawing on shared Judeo-Christian traditions regarding 
exile, oppression, and refuge while also directing political 
attention to human rights abuses in Central America and 
to Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants’ need for safe 
haven. Sanctuary also had a spatial dimension in that dec-
larations of sanctuary attempted to “bound” US law by cre-
ating “safe spaces,” even as participants argued that the US 
territory ought to serve as a refuge for victims of persecu-
tion in Central America. Furthermore, the term “ refugee” 
has a legal dimension that countered accusations of lawless-
ness and therefore was central to the movement’s claim to 
legitimacy. In other words, activists suggested that since the 
US government was failing to live up to its moral and legal 
obligations to grant political asylum to those deserving it 
(i .e . Central American refugees), then it was the obligation 
of congregations to set the moral example by doing so (i .e . 
providing sanctuary under God’s authority), in the process 
using their moral credibility to openly defy what they con-
sidered unjust legal practices until the injustice was formally 
recognized. Nevertheless at the same time that this identity 
allowed Salvadorans to reach out to broad US audiences, it 
also constrained their ability to act in those settings and, 
by reifying the asymmetric power relations between North 
and Central Americans, limited the relationships that could 
be developed. Such constraints were often fully overcome 
only by the most committed sanctuary activists who came 
to experience Salvadoran immigrants acting as empowered 
and strategic activists outside of the “refugee” identity.
The limitations imposed by the “refugee” identity are 
clear in two practices that were central to the US–Central 
American sanctuary movement: granting sanctuary and 
publicizing refugee testimonies. Sanctuary activists granted 
sanctuary by housing undocumented Central Americans in 
the churches, synagogues, or homes of congregation mem-
bers. This arrangement provided Central Americans with 
material assistance, such as housing, food, access to med-
ical care, job assistance, and other social services. At the 
same time, sanctuary was designed to bring congregation 
members into close contact with victims of persecution in 
Central America, and thus to raise congregants’ and others’ 
consciousnesses and spur them to action. As one Salvadoran 
who was living in sanctuary in Tucson during the 1980s 
explained, “The moral and spiritual support that they gave us 
was great. In return, we collaborate in the various churches, 
telling about the terrible experiences that we’ve had in El 
Salvador.”26 Refugee testimonies—public accounts of per-
sonal experiences of violence and persecution—were cen-
tral to these consciousness-raising efforts, and were often 
accompanied by fundraising appeals or information about 
how to get involved. Sanctuary thus often exposed Central 
Americans to intensive scrutiny, and to well-meaning but 
nonetheless culturally laden offers to “help.”27 While they 
often wanted to educate the North American public about 
conditions in their home countries, Central Americans also 
sometimes chafed at the refugee role. One Salvadoran liv-
ing in sanctuary in the San Francisco East Bay in the 1980s 
commented that he preferred relationships that were “per-
son to person instead of person to refugee.” He added, “I 
left my country due to the violence and due to the fear and 
danger of disappearing, not in order to become a refugee. 
To me, the word ‘refugee’ implies inferiority and superior-
ity.”28 Such criticisms did not go unheard, and in fact, there 
were tensions between different segments of the sanctu-
ary movement (in particular, between Tucson and Chicago 
participants) over the necessity of coupling sanctuary with 
testimonies and over which sorts of “stories” ought to be 
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publicized. The visibility, invisibility, and politicization of 
Central Americans were a major issue within these debates.
The “refugee” frame therefore largely presented Central 
Americans to sanctuary workers and to the broader US pub-
lic as “innocent victims” in need of support and as repre-
sentatives of the poor and the oppressed, on whose behalf 
religious communities were compelled to advocate. While 
refugee testimonies frequently described Central Americans’ 
actions (such as leading a labour union or becoming a cat-
echist) in pursuit of social justice in their homelands, the 
“refugee” frame also made it difficult to convey the organ-
izational role that Central Americans played in mobilizing 
religious workers and the solidarity movement more gener-
ally. Thus, sanctuary activists spoke of hearing the Central 
Americans’ call for solidarity and accompaniment, or of 
listening to the Central Americans and following their 
lead. However, the refugee framing necessarily positioned 
such responses as instances of materially better off North 
Americans acting strategically on behalf of the ostensibly 
innocent, authentic, or genuine (as opposed to strategic) 
Central Americans. As a result, this framing constrained 
Central American immigrant activists’ ability to publicly 
identify as political protagonists or take credit for devising 
joint strategies for social and political change, although of 
course there was local and regional variation in the degree 
to which Central and North Americans achieved or were 
presented as equal partners within sanctuary practices.29 
Such framings were themselves, at times unconsciously, 
strategic, in that because the US government accused sanc-
tuary workers of serving political rather than humanitarian 
and religious goals, the revelation that members of FMLN 
groups were involved in or the movement in some capacity, 
or behind the Central American organizations with which 
sanctuary workers collaborated, would have undermined 
sanctuary’s legitimacy.
Legacies and Unintended Consequences
Just as the nature of transnational linkages becomes more 
clear with the passage of time, so too do the unintended 
consequences of US–Central American sanctuary practices. 
Significantly, the rights that Central Americans achieved 
through sanctuary and solidarity activities created grounds, 
in the postwar period, for claiming US residency, despite 
a changed political context. Furthermore, movement par-
ticipants’ organizing experiences created a basis for estab-
lishing a transnational network of immigrant rights NGOs. 
Although the US–Central American sanctuary move-
ment was not the only cause of these developments, it was 
an important precursor whose long-term impact is felt in 
both the United States and El Salvador. Though this impact 
varied from individual to individual and community to 
 community, sanctuary workers’ stated goals included secur-
ing safe haven for Central American refugees, convincing US 
authorities to apply asylum law without regard for the politics 
of the regime from which refugees fled, drawing attention to 
human rights abuses in Central America, providing protec-
tion (via an international presence) to Central Americans 
who were at risk of persecution, and preventing further US 
military intervention in Central American nations. To some 
degree, these objectives were achieved, though not solely 
due to sanctuary activities. In the wake of FMLN final offen-
sive and the assassination of six Jesuit priests in 1989, the US 
government began to pursue a negotiated settlement to the 
civil conflict; the 1990 Immigration Act created Temporary 
Protected Status and named Salvadorans as the first recipi-
ents; asylum procedures were reformed in the early 1990s; 
and in 1997, Salvadorans and Guatemalans who immigrated 
during the Civil War were given the right to apply for legal 
permanent residency. Sanctuary practices thus helped to 
set in motion a complex set of legal developments in the 
United States. At the same time, the movement contributed 
indirectly to the rise in remittances to El Salvador, the cre-
ation of new civil society organizations in El Salvador and 
the United States, and the continued circulation of US activ-
ists, students, scholars, and religious workers in Central 
America. These indirect effects of the movement have 
helped to maintain attention on social justice issues and on 
the needs of refugees and migrants.
In the United States, a key but not always acknow-
ledged legacy of the sanctuary movement is the develop-
ment of new law to address the needs of asylum seekers. 
Throughout the 1980s, sanctuary activists sought legisla-
tion, known as “Moakley-Deconcini” after its sponsors Joe 
Moakley and Dennis Deconcini, which would have granted 
Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) status to Salvadorans 
and Guatemalans. This bill faced stiff opposition from the 
Reagan and Bush administrations, which argued that 
Salvadorans and Guatemalans were economic immigrants 
who fled poverty rather than violence. While efforts to pass 
Moakley-Deconcini were under way, sanctuary workers 
launched their own legal case against the US government. In 
1985, eleven sanctuary activists were indicted on charges of 
conspiracy and alien-smuggling.30 In response, sanctuary 
communities and refugee service organizations filed a civil 
suit, known as American Baptist Churches v . Thornburgh or 
ABC, seeking a halt to sanctuary prosecutions, a grant of 
safe haven to Salvadorans and Guatemalans, and reforms 
that would prevent US foreign policy considerations from 
influencing the outcome of asylum cases. The first two of 
these claims were dismissed on the grounds that US immi-
gration law had changed since the earlier sanctuary pros-
ecutions and that immigration laws were not self-executing. 
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Litigation on the third claim went forward, and the ABC 
case ceased to be directly about sanctuary per se . Then, in 
1990, following the devastating events of the 1989 final 
offensive, in which six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and 
her daughter were murdered by the Salvadoran army, legis-
lation creating a new legal form, Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS), was approved, and Salvadorans were designated as 
the first recipients.31 During the same year, the US govern-
ment agreed to settle the ABC case out of court, and in 1991, 
the settlement agreement gave some 300,000 Salvadorans 
and Guatemalans the right to apply or reapply for polit-
ical asylum under rules designed to ensure fair considera-
tion of their claims. It would seem that sanctuary activists’ 
goal of at least gaining a fair hearing for Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan asylum seekers had been achieved, while at the 
same time, TPS put a halt to deportations. Sanctuary and 
Central American activists had cause to celebrate.
Despite these victories, in the 1990s, events conspired to 
thwart the promise that TPS and the ABC settlement held 
out. First, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) put ABC asylum applications on the back burner in 
order to focus on quickly deciding new asylum petitions. 
Peace accords were signed in El Salvador in 1992 and in 
Guatemala in 1996, but interviews on ABC class members’ 
asylum claims were not scheduled until 1997. By then, it was 
more difficult for applicants to demonstrate a well-founded 
fear of persecution, given that the wars in their homelands 
were officially over. Second, in 1996, the US Congress 
approved the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which made many forms of 
legalization more difficult. In particular, ABC applicants 
had hoped that if their asylum claims were denied, they 
could then apply for Suspension of Deportation, a form of 
legalization available to individuals who could demonstrate 
good moral character, seven years of continuous presence in 
the United States, and that deportation would be an extreme 
hardship. IIRIRA replaced Suspension of Deportation with 
Cancellation of Removal, for which applicants had to prove 
good moral character, ten years of continuous presence, 
and that deportation would pose extreme and exceptional 
hardship for the applicant’s US citizen or legal permanent 
resident spouse, parent, or child. The heightened hardship 
standard, increased number of years of continuous pres-
ence, and introduction of the requirement of a qualifying 
relative meant that fewer ABC class members were likely 
to qualify. Furthermore, IIRIRA capped cancellation cases 
at 4,000 annually, making this an unlikely solution for the 
approximately 300,000 ABC class members with pending 
asylum claims.
In this changed legal scenario, Central American organiz-
ations and immigrant rights activists sought new  legislation 
that would enable ABC class members to become legal 
permanent residents. By allying with Nicaraguans and with 
the support of the Clinton administration and the Central 
American governments, advocates obtained the passage of 
the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief 
Act (NACARA) in 1997. NACARA basically restored ABC 
class members’ suspension eligibility (renaming this “spe-
cial rule cancellation”) and exempted these cases from the 
4,000 cap. The regulations that implemented NACARA 
also granted applicants a rebuttable presumption of hard-
ship, virtually guaranteeing a grant in most cases, and took 
the unprecedented step of codifying the factors that went 
into the assessment of hardship. Through NACARA, some 
83,340 Salvadorans and Guatemalans were able to become 
legal permanent residents.32 These legal developments 
benefited not only Central Americans, but also nation-
als from other countries (including Burundi, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, 
and Herzegovina) who have received TPS due to emergen-
cies in their home countries, as well as establishing a preced-
ent for other groups, such as Haitians, who benefited from 
passage of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act 
(HRIFA) in 1998. Sanctuary and Central American advo-
cates’ original focus on asylum, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
changed the US legal landscape in ways that could not have 
been anticipated.
While not solely attributable to sanctuary activities, 
increased remittances to El Salvador are an indirect effect 
of these legal changes that the sanctuary movement helped 
bring about. As legal developments have increased the sta-
bility and job security of Salvadorans living in the United 
States they may also have improved these migrants’ ability 
to remit to family members in El Salvador.33 Specifically, 
remittances increased gradually throughout the 1980s, but 
grew more rapidly after 1990, when TPS was awarded. While 
in 1990 the country received less than $500 million, by 2007, 
Salvadorans living abroad sent almost $3.7 billion in remit-
tances to family members living in El Salvador.34 The quan-
tity and importance of remittances to the country has not 
only risen in absolute terms; even more tellingly they have 
risen as a share of the country’s total gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). Between 1990 and 2004, remittances more than 
doubled as a share of the country’s overall economy, going 
from about 6 per cent to over 15 per cent of El Salvador’s 
GDP.35 At the same time, migrant remittances have had a 
huge impact on the economy of El Salvador, permitting the 
economy to stay afloat through economic readjustment pro-
grams of the postwar period.36 This development in turn 
has made the legal status of Salvadorans in the US a matter 
of concern in El Salvador. Indeed, extending TPS, which was 
re-awarded to Salvadorans following the 2001 earthquakes 
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and which at the time of writing was scheduled to expire in 
September 2010, has been a high priority of the Salvadoran 
government.37 In fact, during the 2004 presidential elec-
tion in El Salvador, some US politicians suggested that the 
United States could cut off remittance flows by rescinding 
TPS, were the FMLN candidate to be elected.38
Networks of civil society organizations in both El 
Salvador and the United States are another legacy of the 
US–Central American sanctuary movement. During a 2001 
interview, an attorney who represented one of the first suc-
cessful Salvadoran asylum seekers at the beginning of the 
1980s described how his work provided a model for other 
groups dedicated to immigrants’ rights:
I organized networks of lawyers in big law firms to provide assist-
ance in political asylum cases, or pro bono cases. That’s sort of the 
Lawyers Committee’s mode of operation. They organize big law 
firms and their lawyers to do free work on big civil rights matters. 
Or small civil rights matters. It’s a way of organizing networks …. 
And I, in addition to organizing legal work and volunteer rep-
resentation also organized teams of policy people from different 
organizations to look at big policy questions …. Now, that work in 
the Lawyers Committee, in my own mind at least, accomplished a 
couple of things. In addition to the work we actually did, it became 
the model for lawyers committees and the rights offices around 
the country. So, Robert Rubin’s operation in San Francisco, 
Public Counsel’s immigration work in LA, the Immigrant Rights 
Projects of the Lawyers’ Committees in Boston and Chicago all 
were kind of modeled on what I started here in Washington …. 
[And,] this political work I was doing at the Lawyersí Committee, 
as opposed to the legal work, was the foundation for the National 
Immigration Forum.
In addition to these networks of immigrant rights organ-
izations, many of the Central American groups that mobil-
ized sanctuary workers have become established institu-
tions, providing much needed social services and advocacy 
work in their communities. For example, in Los Angeles, 
CARECEN purchased its own building during the 1990s, 
and, in September 2008, celebrated its twenty-fifth anni-
versary. Most recently, in Los Angeles, networks of attor-
neys and civil society organizations have been mobilized in 
response to workplace raids conducted by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement. According to a recent Los Angeles 
Times article, “The effort has parallels to the sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s, when churches brought Central 
American refugees to the US to protect them from political 
violence.”39
Likewise, in El Salvador, groups that focused on refugee 
rights during the 1980s have given rise to coalitions that 
now advocate for migrants’ rights more generally. During 
the 1980s, the El Salvador offices of ACNUR (UNHCR, 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees), OIM 
(IOM, International Organization for Migration), Catholic 
Charities, and Catholic Relief Services provided support 
for refugees who were attempting to flee persecution, while 
groups such as CRIPDES (Comité Cristiano pro- Desplazados 
de El Salvador, Christian Committee for the Displaced of 
El Salvador) and Tutela Legal denounced and publicized 
human rights violations. During this period, sanctuary 
congregations in the United States sometimes also became 
sister parishes of congregations in El Salvador, through the 
SHARE Foundation, which also organized delegations of 
visitors to war-torn communities. During the postwar per-
iod, as border enforcement in Mexico and the United States 
became more stringent and as deportations from the United 
States mounted, Maria Victoria de Áviles, the then–human 
rights ombudsperson in El Salvador, founded the Mesa 
Permanente sobre Migrantes y Población Desarraigada 
(Permanent Board on Migrants and Uprooted Populations), 
which in turn developed into the Foro del Migrante (Migrant 
Forum), and most recently, into the Mesa Permanente de la 
Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos para 
las Personas Migrantes (Permanent Board of the Ombudsry 
for the Defense of Human Rights for Migrant Peoples).40 The 
composition of these coalitions has varied, but generally has 
included government, academic, religious, and community 
groups concerned about human rights and immigration. In 
addition, some solidarity organizations that were formed 
in the United States have founded their own counterparts 
in El Salvador. An example is CARECEN Internacional, 
located in San Salvador, which grew out of the network of 
CARECEN organizations in the United States. The opposite 
has also occurred, with the San Salvador office of the gang 
violence prevention group Homies Unidos giving rise to a 
Los Angeles office of the same group.41
These networks of civil society organizations in the United 
States and El Salvador have fostered the continued circula-
tion of activists, scholars, students, and religious workers 
in El Salvador. Conferences, such as the Salvadoreños en el 
Mundo (Salvadorans in the World) or Semana del Migrante 
(immigrant week) events, or meetings or workshops organ-
ized around a particular theme, regularly bring together 
scholars, students, and NGO members who work on or in 
El Salvador. NGOs in El Salvador collaborate with US stu-
dents and researchers to collect data and issue reports, and 
with other US and Salvadoran NGOs to exchange informa-
tion and develop strategies. The Committee In Solidarity 
with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), CIS (Centro de 
Intercambio and Solidaridad, Center for Exchange and 
Solidarity), SHARE, and other groups continue to organ-
ize delegations to El Salvador. Hometown associations in 
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the United States are also key components of this continued 
circulation, as they direct resources and knowledge from the 
United States to El Salvador and vice versa .42 This continued 
circulation has given rise to a transnational civil society cir-
cuit, not unlike the transnational linkages that mobilized 
solidarity and sanctuary work in the United States during 
the 1980s. By directing resources, knowledge, labour, and 
particular products (including reports, testimonies, and 
expertise) to organizations and individuals, this circuit is 
critical to the continued mobilization of social justice work 
in El Salvador and in the United States. Moreover, polit-
ical parties on both the left and right have taken notice of 
these thick social networks and the resources to which they 
have access, and have sought to work with these organiza-
tions, while setting up their own support networks in the 
United States. For instance, during the buildup to the 2009 
Salvadoran presidential campaign, the FMLN and ARENA 
candidates have both visited several major US cities where 
Salvadorans are most concentrated, vying for the commun-
ity’s political and financial support.43
Conclusion: Coming Full Circle
The US–Central American sanctuary movement origin-
ally began as an attempt to draw attention to the unjust 
conditions in El Salvador, conditions that US foreign policy 
greatly exacerbated. The movement has now come full cir-
cle as campaigns by immigrant rights organizations in El 
Salvador have gone from advocating for the rights of refu-
gees, to immigrants’ rights, to the right not to migrate. This 
most recent focus is designed to call attention to unjust 
conditions within El Salvador, the dangerous nature of the 
trek to the United States, and the lack of rights accorded 
to unauthorized immigrants upon arrival. In El Salvador, 
immigrants’ rights organizations, such as CARECEN 
Internacional, publicize the risks of migration, such as los-
ing limbs while attempting to board a moving train or dying 
of thirst or suffocation while crossing a desert or hiding in a 
locked compartment of a vehicle. These groups also present 
forums to Salvadoran youth, warning them of the dangers 
of the journey and urging them to develop their own leader-
ship, entrepreneurial, and job skills in El Salvador. Finally, 
such groups urge Salvadoran authorities to address the 
root causes of emigration. For example, the opening sec-
tion of the Mesa Permanente’s 2007 minimum platform on 
migrants’ rights states:
Salvadoran migration, like that of so many other Latin American 
countries, is the ultimate choice of thousands of compatriots faced 
with a context of serious violations of their human rights, espe-
cially their economic, social, and cultural rights ….
The current reality of the Salvadoran state, characterized by eco-
nomic inequalities, lack of work, low salaries, constant increases in 
the cost of living, and the lack of educational opportunities, leads 
thousands of Salvadoran men and women to chose to migrate to a 
country that will allow them to find and satisfy those living condi-
tions that El Salvador neither afforded them nor permitted them 
to achieve.44
In other words, the focus on the right not to migrate is 
intended to motivate individuals, communities, NGOs, and 
Salvadoran authorities to address the unjust underlying 
social, economic, and political conditions that give rise to 
emigration and thus prevent it, rather than focusing only 
on the human rights of migrants in transit or on migrants’ 
legal rights in the United States. Such a move builds on ear-
lier movement debates over the validity of the distinction 
between economic migrants and political refugees, debates 
that were muted by asylum law that focused on political per-
secution rather than economic need. The current refocusing, 
like solidarity and sanctuary work of the 1980s, is designed 
to promote peace and justice within El Salvador.
By revisiting the US–Central American sanctuary move-
ment, we have sought to draw attention to the transnational 
nature of this movement and to the movement’s long-term 
impact. Central Americans who were members of popu-
lar movements in El Salvador played key roles in mobiliz-
ing religious workers to develop sanctuary activities, yet, 
for strategic and cultural reasons, their role was not fully 
acknowledged during the 1980s. That is, Central Americans 
were publicly recognized as inspirations and examples to 
follow, but were not openly treated as political organizers of 
sanctuary activities within the United States. These fram-
ings of Central Americans as inspirations and examples 
emphasized the religious and humanitarian nature of the 
movement in contrast to US authorities’ attempts to dis-
credit sanctuary as a purely political activity. The framing of 
Central Americans as refugees, as innocent victims in need 
of aid, furthered the notion that Central Americans were 
beneficiaries rather than protagonists in the movement. In 
noting how Central American activists mobilized sanctuary 
and solidarity work as part of a broader effort to oppose the 
Salvadoran government during the civil conflict, we do not 
mean to suggest that movement members deliberately mis-
led anyone, or that Central Americans themselves concealed 
their roles from North Americans. Rather, we draw atten-
tion to the ways that historical, political, and social contexts 
shape what can be said and known, and the fact that with 
hindsight, relationships and actions that were once con-
cealed, perhaps even from their authors, become apparent.
Hindsight also makes it possible to assess the unintended 
consequences of social movements. Social movement theory 
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draws attention to the strategic goals that movements pur-
sue, and to the factors, such as political opportunities, 
resources, and successful framing, that permit movement 
members to achieve these goals. Moreover, recent work by 
David Meyer has found that taking credit for achieving 
desirable outcomes is an important part of politics, espe-
cially for social movements. He argues that claiming credit 
is analogous to establishing a reputation and shows that 
some contextual factors allow some movement actors to be 
better positioned to promote a narrative of their own influ-
ence than others.45 As we’ve shown in this study, Salvadoran 
activists were precluded from fully claiming credit for their 
roles in the sanctuary movement by the very refugee iden-
tity that the movement used to effectively frame the issue. 
Unfortunately, some of the scholarly work on the Central 
American sanctuary movement has also been analytically 
constrained by this refugee frame and thus inadvertently 
reinforced Central American immigrant activists’ inability 
to claim credit for their roles in the movement.46
We have also sought to identify the unintended conse-
quences of pursuing strategic goals. Sanctuary workers and 
Central American activists set out to oppose human rights 
abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala, curtail US interven-
tion in Central America, obtain asylum for persecution 
 victims who had fled to the United States, promote the legit-
imacy of the popular struggle (by countering Reagan and 
Bush administration claims that the insurgency was insti-
gated by the Soviet Union or that it was a puppet of inter-
national communism) and provide protection to Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan communities that were at risk of military 
violence. Movement actors did not, at the time, envision 
that Central Americans would be filing suspension or can-
cellation claims (as provided by NACARA), that Congress 
would create Temporary Protected Status, that their work 
would contribute to remittance flows, that they would play 
a key role in creating a transnational network of civil soci-
ety organizations, or that such organizations would foster 
the continued circulation of activists and others between 
the United States and El Salvador. Such outcomes were by-
products of the movement, perhaps means to an end, rather 
than explicit goals and, of course, are not wholly attributable 
to the movement itself. Nonetheless, theory that treats social 
movements primarily as instrumental action, even while 
acknowledging the symbolic components (such as “fram-
ing”) of such action, has a difficult time explaining move-
ments’ unintended consequences.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for this special 
issue, we hope to stress the particularity of sanctuary activ-
ities. In some ways, in California and Arizona at least, the 
US–Central American sanctuary movement of the 1980s 
was not about immigration at all, but rather sought to 
address social injustice in Central American nations, US 
intervention in Central America, and the effects of political 
violence on individuals and communities. Although sanc-
tuary, as currently carried out in Canada, Europe, and the 
United States, may bear formal similarity to US–Central 
American sanctuary practices of the 1980s, it might be wise 
to pay attention to the specificity of the particular immi-
gration flows that give rise to sanctuary in particular social 
and historical contexts, whether these be local, national, or 
regional. Why are some individuals granted sanctuary while 
others are not? What particular laws or policies are sanctu-
ary practices designed to address? And are sanctuary prac-
tices geared primarily toward a local or national context or 
do they also seek to intervene in transnational relationships 
and conditions? Addressing these questions will enrich 
scholarship on sanctuary in its many manifestations.
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